

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002995

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, INR, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA JFRIEDMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PTER](#) [PINR](#) [PINS](#) [NL](#) [KPRP](#)

SUBJECT: CRITICAL REPORT ON DUTCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AIVD)

REF: (A) THE HAGUE 2929 (B) THE HAGUE 2308

Summary

1. On November 16, a special blue-ribbon panel published its long-awaited evaluation of the Dutch AIVD (civilian intelligence service). The "Havermans Committee," which included a former Interior Minister and several senior officials, was formed in February 2004 at the request of Interior Minister Remkes. The move came in response to parliamentary criticism about a series of AIVD missteps including confusion over the number of suspected terrorists in Holland, failure to prosecute suspects identified by AIVD, and clumsy handling of the investigation of the fianci of a Royal family member. The release of the panel's report in the aftermath of the Van Gogh killing (reftel A) was timely but coincidental.

2. The report endorsed C/T organizational reform measures already underway (reftel B) as well as the British "JTAC" style of integrated C/T coordination. Key findings of the Havermans Report include:

- ?Cumbersome bureaucratic structure that hinders C/T operation, particularly overlap and ambiguity between the Justice and Interior Ministries.
- ?A lack of coherent policy guidance and prioritization.
- ?Poor oversight of AIVD and insufficient supervisory mechanisms and authorities.
- ?Insufficient information sharing with law enforcement agencies (particularly at the local level) and a culture of withholding information.
- ?Inadequate staff and funding.

Tasks

3. According to the assessment, the AIVD has a coherent set of duties crucial to the protection of national security (counterterrorism, violent political activism, non-proliferation and counter espionage). As a result of the current focus on combating radical Islamic terrorism, AIVD, however, lacks sufficient means and manpower to address all potential threats. Despite this, the committee did not recommend AIVD should cut back on any of its tasks, nor did the committee consider it necessary to give the AIVD any additional powers (other than those included in recently proposed bills).

Responsibility

4. The Havermans Committee concluded AIVD's management was fragmented and unclear, because four ministers and three national coordinators were involved in its activities. Although AIVD falls within the Interior Ministry, there is no clear structure to select and prioritize relevant expectations and to task the AIVD with assignments. Therefore, AIVD itself mostly determines its own priorities and activities. Considering this undesirable, the committee recommended the Interior Minister be made responsible for setting AIVD priorities in an annual AIVD plan that would be discussed in the National Security Council and submitted to the Cabinet for approval.

Cooperation

5. The committee was concerned about the lack of cooperation between AIVD and other organizations, in particular the police. It welcomed measures to streamline information sharing and endorsed initiatives by the National CT Coordinator to form an analytical unit (similar to the UK), in which all relevant organizations within the government cooperate in high-quality analyses of terror threats and counterterrorism in the Netherlands (reftel B). The committee also recommended expanding the so-called CT Infobox, a handful of senior officials who direct information gathering on a fluctuating group of about 150 suspect persons. The report called for closer international cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies and increased stationing of AIVD liaisons abroad.

Reaction

16. Interior Minister Remkes endorsed the recommendations about drawing up an annual AIVD plan. He agreed with the committee's conclusion cooperation between AIVD and police, prosecutors and mayors should be intensified, and recommended AIVD improve the sharing of information with other parties. Together with the Defense Minister, Remkes will take the initiative to intensify cooperation between AIVD and the MIVD military intelligence service. Nevertheless, he cautioned there would always be information that could not be shared widely. Remkes also referred approvingly to the agreement reached during the November 11 parliamentary debate about the Van Gogh murder to increase AIVD's budget by 100 million euros. Despite increased resources, he warned against excessive expectations.

17. Remkes submitted the report to the Second Chamber (Lower House of Parliament) for review. Initial MP reactions have been positive.

Comment

18. AIVD has come under increased scrutiny and criticism recently, particularly after the van Gogh murder (reftel A). AIVD will likely use this report to justify more resources. We welcome the independent assessment of AIVD's problems (particularly highlighting its reluctance to share information either with domestic or international partners/colleagues), but it is unclear whether AIVD will change the way it does business even with more staff and funds.

Sobel